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Abstract Climate change assessments rely upon scenarios of socioeconomic devel-
opments to conceptualize alternative outcomes for global greenhouse gas emissions.
These are used in conjunction with climate models to make projections of future
climate. Specifically, the estimations of greenhouse gas emissions based on socioeco-
nomic scenarios constrain climate models in their outcomes of temperatures, precipi-
tation, etc. Traditionally, the fundamental logic of the socioeconomic scenarios—that
is, the logic that makes them plausible—is developed and prioritized using methods
that are very subjective. This introduces a fundamental challenge for climate change
assessment: The veracity of projections of future climate currently rests on subjec-
tive ground. We elaborate on these subjective aspects of scenarios in climate change
research. We then consider an alternative method for developing scenarios, a sys-
tems dynamics approach called ‘Cross-Impact Balance’ (CIB) analysis. We discuss
notions of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ as criteria for distinguishing appropriate sce-
nario methods for climate change research. We distinguish seven distinct meanings
of ‘objective,’ and demonstrate that CIB analysis is more objective than traditional
subjective approaches. However, we also consider criticisms concerning which of the
seven meanings of ‘objective’ are appropriate for scenario work. Finally, we arrive
at conclusions regarding which meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ are relevant
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for climate change research. Because scientific assessments uncover knowledge rel-
evant to the responses of a real, independently existing climate system, this requires
scenario methodologies employed in such studies to also uphold the seven meanings
of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’
Keywords Scientific objectivity · Climate science · Socioeconomic scenario
testing · Socioeconomic scenarios · Objective/subjective methods for socioeconomic
projections · Climate projections · IPCC projections · Cognitive Bias
1 Introduction
Philosophy of science can make contributions to climate science. In this case, we do
so by inspecting and evaluating alternative methods for producing scenarios used in
projecting future climate and, potentially, the impacts of a changing climate (Winsberg
2010; Douglas 2007, 2008). The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (or IPCC) serves as the authoritative body for assessing and synthesizing inter-
disciplinary research on climate change. In periodic Assessment Reports, the IPCC
provides a full picture of timely scientific findings—including human influences on
the climate system anticipated over the twenty-first century. For such work, the IPCC
assessment process needs scenarios of potential socioeconomic developments around
the globe, which are used in conjunction with various climate model runs in order to
make projections of future climate (Hibbard et al. 2007). Socioeconomic scenarios
may be thought of as possible future states of the world and are needed to provide,
inter alia, estimations of emissions of greenhouse gasses to constrain climate models in
their outcomes of temperatures, precipitation, etc. More specifically, scenarios, which
include factors like population size, technological capacities, and energy use, are used
to project greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon dioxide, methane, and ozone that
are then fed into climate models as inputs. Different scenarios—for example, ones
that differ in the population growth of India and its technological levels—could yield
very different emission outcomes for some target year such as 2050; these would serve
as contrasting greenhouse gas inputs into the climate models, thus yielding either a
higher or lower projection for temperature in 2050.
The above description of scenarios developed and used in the IPCC assessment
process requires input from many experts spanning multiple fields. Thus IPCC Assess-
ment Reports are a massive exercise in social knowledge building, of which scenarios
are only one part. These scenarios are vetted by many experts and are subject to
the rigors of economic and earth system modeling. However, since the late 1990s,
the fundamental logic of the scenarios—that is, the logic that makes these scenarios
plausible—has been developed and prioritized under conditions that are subjective.
This introduces a fundamental challenge for IPCC assessment: The veracity of pro-
jections of future climate currently rests on very subjective ground. In this paper, we
examine the foundation of these scenarios and compare two methods of utilizing a
diversity of expert judgment/opinion to develop them. The two methods are group
consensus building (Intuitive logics) versus the elicitation of independent experts
(Cross-Impact Balances). Through this comparison, we arrive at an evaluation of
these different exercises in social knowledge building for scenarios used in scientific
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assessments. In this paper, we note that we are not evaluating the validity of differ-
ent methods of building scenarios overall, but rather strictly in relation to the needs
of scientific assessments, such as those taken up by the IPCC. Such assessments are
boundary objects at the science-policy interface, where scientists aim to convey major
conclusions from scientific research with policy implications to decision-makers. The
arguments in our analysis do not treat the validity of scenario-building methods in
alternative contexts such as for business planning or military strategizing. Because of
the critical linkage that socioeconomic scenarios play in the IPCC context, we believe
that the specification of these scenarios should be subject to standards of rigor and
objectivity that are similar to that expected of conventional scientific studies.
This paper is organized into eight parts. First, we introduce the background for
building scenarios in climate change research, and second, describe necessary steps
for all methods that develop such scenarios. Third, we elaborate on the subjective
(i.e., qualitative or narrative) aspects of scenarios in climate change research, and we
introduce and discuss the dominant method for developing these qualitative scenar-
ios, a group consensus approach which is called ‘Intuitive Logics.’ Fourth, we turn
our attention to an alternative method, which is called ‘Cross-Impact Balance’ (CIB)
analysis. Fifth, we discuss objectivity as a criterion for distinguishing superior quali-
tative scenario generation methods for scientific assessments of climate change. Sixth,
we examine a defense of Intuitive Logics in this context. Seventh, we weigh the vari-
ous claims for objective and subjective qualities of scenarios for scientific assessments
such as that undertaken by the IPCC. And finally, we arrive at conclusions for which
scenario methodology should be preferred.
1.1 Socioeconomic scenarios in climate change research
Climate change is an intertemporal, coupled human and natural system problem of
such scale that conventional tools for policy analysis, which would be appropriate on
shorter time frames, such as extrapolating future trends from historical projections, fail
(Morgan et al. 1999). Instead, scenarios depicting highly contrasted possibilities for
the future—that is, very different from each other and the present—are more appro-
priate for understanding the implications of climate change. Historically, alternative
scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities were tightly coupled
to climate model simulations (Girod et al. 2009). However, as models specializing
in socioeconomic change have matured [so-called integrated assessment (IA) mod-
els], there has been a division of labor between IA and general circulation modeling
(Hibbard et al. 2007). IA models now treat explicitly analyses of socioeconomic
change, while general circulation modeling treats explicitly the responses of the cli-
mate system.
Scientific theories and laws enable scientists to predict or anticipate outcomes in
the world given some set of working assumptions. Since the First Assessment Report
of the IPCC, IA model results have served as the working assumptions for general
circulation models (Hibbard et al. 2007). However, IA models also require some set of
working assumptions to arrive at their results. In preparation for the Third Assessment
Report, the IPCC commissioned a Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakicen-
ovic et al. 2000). This report demonstrated a technique for selecting input assumptions
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for IA models—e.g., those representing future states of population, energy use, and
economic growth—that is known as the ‘Story and Simulation’ approach (Alcamo
2001, 2008). Storylines qualitatively describe alternative futures (or scenarios) and
take on a narrative form, while ‘simulation’ refers to an IA model that quantifies the
descriptions (Carter et al. 2007; Raskin et al. 2005; Rounsevell and Metzger 2010).
The scenario is considered the conjoined product of the story and the simulation.
In this paper, our focus is on the techniques for how part of these conjoined products,
the stories, the qualitative descriptions of a scenario, are constructed.
In general, there are two fundamental challenges for these storylines and their
final products, socioeconomic scenarios: (1) demonstrating internal consistency and
(2) ensuring that a small set of selected scenarios are sufficiently comprehensive—
that is, that important possible futures have not been left out (Schweizer and Kriegler
2012), either because they were unimagined or subjectively deemed undesirable for
further investigation. Different schools of thought pertaining to scenarios address these
challenges in different ways (Bradfield et al. 2005). In this paper, we critically exam-
ine two methods that could be used to develop storyline (or narrative) components of
scenarios for climate change research. We first treat the dominant school employed
in environmental change assessments and used for scenarios for IPCC assessments,
which is Intuitive Logics (EEA 2009; Rounsevell and Metzger 2010). Second, we treat
a new method for developing narratives, which is CIB analysis (Weimer-Jehle 2006).
It should be noted that for global socioeconomic scenarios developed for IPCC assess-
ments, only three methods have been demonstrated for developing storylines: Intu-
itive Logics (Nakicenovic et al. 2000), CIB analysis (Schweizer and Kriegler 2012;
Schweizer and O’Neill 2013), and scenario discovery (Rozenberg et al. 2013). We
focus on the CIB method because it is a substitutable improvement to Intuitive Logics
(Kosow 2011), which is the reigning approach to developing scenarios discussed by
the IPCC. In contrast, the notion of scenario discovery (Lempert 2012) has important
differences from both Intuitive Logics and CIB that make a discussion of its respective
strengths and limitations tangential to the discussions of objectivity elaborated below.
In this paper, we are not evaluating the validity of different methods of building
scenarios overall, but rather strictly in relation to the needs of scientific assessments,
such as those taken up by the IPCC. Such assessments are boundary objects at the
science-policy interface, where scientists aim to convey major conclusions from sci-
entific research with policy implications to decision-makers. The arguments in our
analysis do not treat the validity of different scenario methods in alternative contexts
such as for business planning or military strategizing.
We focus on the climate change case because among other global change research
fields—i.e., land use, water, biodiversity—climate is the most mature. It has set an
example for coordinated international science-policy research in other fields, including
for the development and use of scenarios. Additionally, it is the only global change
field that produces regular Assessment Reports (Clark 2013), and as a result, has
developed a rather sophisticated view of scenarios in many respects, which we discuss
in Sect. 7. Because of the critical linkage that socioeconomic scenarios play in the
IPCC context, we believe that the specification of socioeconomic storylines for such
purposes should be subject to similar standards of rigor and objectivity as conventional
scientific studies.
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2 Necessary steps for developing storyline scenarios
Regardless of the method used to develop them, and regardless of how detailed the
scenarios are, all storyline aspects of scenarios describe alternative plausible contexts
for possible future change. Thus all storyline scenarios require the specification of
scenario characteristics (also called variables, driving forces, factors, or elements)
as well as alternative outcomes for these characteristics. The storyline, or narrative,
describes why the particulars of the scenario should be considered plausible, such as
the interrelation between scenario variables.
In both Intuitive Logics and CIB analysis, scenario authors exercise judgment
for selecting scenario variables, selecting alternative outcomes for the variables, and
describing how the outcomes and variables are interrelated if at all. The main differ-
ences between the methods are how the judgments for variables, their outcomes, and
their interrelations are recorded and processed. Intuitive Logics methods approach
these issues holistically, while CIB analysis approaches them formally (Tietje 2005),
mechanically (Dawes 2001), or analytically. In turn, these differences affect how plau-
sible scenarios are identified. Moreover, differences in the elicitation of judgments,
information processing, and the selection of plausible scenarios translate to different
orientations toward confronting uncertainty. These differences also bear implications
for objectivity and, ultimately, for the appropriateness of these different methods for
developing scenarios for scientific assessments.
3 The traditional scenario-building approach: the Intuitive Logics method
3.1 Introduction to Intuitive Logics
Intuitive Logics approaches were developed in think tanks such as SRI International
and RAND for war games (Aligica 2004) and in corporations such as General Electric
and Shell for business planning (Millett 2009; Wack 1985). Intuitive Logics are still
used widely for scenario studies including for environmental change assessments
(Bishop et al. 2007; EEA 2009; Rounsevell and Metzger 2010). They involve gathering
experts who presumably know best about the situation or issue (Ogilvy and Schwartz
1998; Schweizer 2010). The basic idea is to collect a group of people with various
expertise in the desired fields believed to be relevant, and to have the group meet
together and engage in what Jungermann and Thuring called ‘disciplined intuition’
(quoted in Bradfield et al. 2005, p. 806) to arrive at a handful of distinct stories (Wilson
1998 cited in Mietzner and Reger 2004, p. 59).
The ‘discipline’ of this method follows a very basic three-step recipe. As a group,
scenario authors (i) brainstorm and discuss key uncertainties and the ‘driving forces’
behind alternative outcomes for the future. (ii) From this group brainstorm, two key
uncertainties are prioritized by the group. Two polar outcomes are also assigned to each
uncertainty, such as ‘strong’ and ‘weak.’ This results in four distinguishing futures as
shown in Fig. 1. (iii) Stories for these alternative futures are then fleshed out in a focus
group setting, where the group is free to elaborate on as many scenario variables as
desired; however, the outcomes of scenario variables are constrained by the quadrant
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Fig. 1 The intuitive logics matrix (left) and its application for the IPCC Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios (right). The four IPCC scenario typologies, A1, A2, B1, B2, are shown in dashed boxes
in which the scenario is placed, due to the fixed polar outcomes of the two key uncer-
tainties. Additionally, it should be noted that Intuitive Logics resist the assignment
of likelihood estimates to the scenarios (Millett 2009). By convention, Intuitive Log-
ics scenarios are presented as equally plausible with no comment on their respective
likelihoods. In the scenarios used by past IPCC reports, the following were identified
as the two key uncertainties: Global trends for economic and political organization
(e.g. globalization) and global trends for the priority of development policy (Nakicen-
ovic et al. 2000). The polar outcomes for economic and political organization were
high globalization versus protectionism (regionalism), while for development pol-
icy, the polar outcomes were conventional economic development versus sustainable
development.
In the IPCC case, after these two driving forces were identified for the scenarios, the
four scenario types were used as a backdrop for further elaboration by scenario authors
as a group with detail for global trends in population growth, economic growth, global
trends for the energy intensity of economies, global trends for the carbon intensity of
primary energy sources, global trends for the availability of fossil fuels, and global
trends for changes in land use. As noted previously, the specific outcomes for these
additional scenario variables were determined by the larger contexts of the future
worlds established by Intuitive Logics. For example, the scenario authors decided that
plausible scenarios for the A2 world would describe a future with high energy- and
carbon-intensity due to continued reliance on cheap fossil fuels under conventional
development. A2 also depicts slower global economic growth due to a reversal of
globalization, which results in high global population growth. In contrast, scenario
authors decided plausible scenarios for the B1 world would describe a future with low
energy- and carbon-intensity due to a shift away from fossil fuels under sustainable
development. B1 also depicts high economic growth due to globalization, which results
in low global population growth.
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3.2 Strengths of Intuitive Logics
The success of Intuitive Logics approaches can be attributed to two major strengths.
First, because the ‘discipline’ of the method is so basic, it is highly flexible and
easy to implement. The second strength is rooted in the claim by Stephen Millett
that “a discontinuous future cannot be reliably forecasted, but it can be imagined”
(2003, p. 18). In other words, the failure of extrapolations of historical trends to account
for discontinuities such as social fads or technological breakthroughs is a primary
justification for embracing the creative approach of Intuitive Logics for exploring
different possibilities for the future—even in scientific environmental assessments.
As noted in the report entitled Ecosystems and human well-being: Scenarios, which
was prepared for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
[S]cenario analysis requires approaches that transcend the limits of conven-
tional deterministic models of change. Predictive modeling is appropriate for
simulating well-understood systems over sufficiently short times (Peterson et al.
2003). But as complexity increases and the time horizon lengthens, the power
of prediction diminishes. …The development of methods to blend quantitative
and qualitative insight effectively is at the frontier of scenario research today.
[A reference is then made to a figure that represents the story-and-simulation
approach, where scenarios exist at the boundary between ‘stories’ and ‘models.’]
…[Qualitative] narrative offers texture, richness, and insight, while quantitative
analysis offers structure, discipline, and rigor. The most relevant recent efforts
are those that have sought to balance these (Raskin et al. 2005, p. 40).
3.3 Limitations of Intuitive Logics in the context of climate change research
However, there are four chief problems with building scenarios with Intuitive Logics
methods in the context of IPCC or other environmental assessments.
The first problem is that of reproducibility, or replicability. As candidly acknowl-
edged by the originator of the notion that storylines could be fruitfully linked with
simulations, Joseph Alcamo,
A keystone of scientific credibility is the reproducibility of an experiment or
analysis. For this reason it is significant that the storylines produced in the
[Intuitive Logics] scenario exercises do not meet this benchmark. Storylines are
usually developed through a group process in which the assumptions and men-
tal models of the storyline writers remain unstated. Therefore the storyline is
difficult if not impossible to reproduce. This lack of reproducibility reinforces
the impression that storylines are ‘unscientific’ even though they may be based
on a more sophisticated concept … than portrayed by any mathematical model”
(2008, pp. 141–142).
The second problem is that of complexity. The dynamics of socioeconomic change
are information intensive, involving the correlations and relationships between a large
set of variables, and likely too complicated for individuals or groups to hold in mind
and manipulate, all at one time—and yet, this is precisely what experts in Intuitive
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Logics are asked to provide holistically in the form of aggregate, complete, plau-
sible scenarios.1 As discussed previously in Sect. 1.1, in climate change research,
the storylines developed through Intuitive Logics are appended to simulations per-
formed by IA models. In addition to the constraining role that the stories can play for
the integrated assessment models, the story-and-simulation pairing is tacit acknowl-
edgment of the complexity limitation for stories, as the simulations are also seen as a
mechanism for verifying the internal consistency of the stories. However, simulation
alone does not correct for additional limitations of Intuitive Logics.
The third problem is that of sampling the space of possible futures, which is poten-
tially extremely large. With Intuitive Logics, the convention to focus on two key
uncertainties is the primary strategy for selecting a small sample.2 Unlike statistics,
where the aim for sampling is that the sample be typical and representative of a real
population, sampling in Intuitive Logics is done for the purpose of demonstrating that
uncertainties for the future are irreducible. In other words, the purpose of the four
alternative futures is to convey that perfect foresight does not exist and that any par-
ticular rendition of the future could be just as persuasive as an alternative. Since this is
the main purpose, it is viewed as distracting (or worse, misleading) information to pro-
vide any estimates of likelihood for the scenarios. Additionally, only a few scenarios
would be needed to demonstrate this point—two or four scenarios are viewed as just
as sufficient as large numbers of scenarios. Therefore, the working sampling assump-
tion in Intuitive Logics is that the selection of two key uncertainties will result in four
contrasted futures that are sufficiently different and comprehensive for the purposes
of exploring the future and contemplating the ramifications of alternative outcomes.
Contrast this with the statistical view, where samples of sufficiently large sizes (e.g.
N ≥ 30) are preferred.
This working sampling assumption in Intuitive Logics might be acceptable were it
not for the fourth problem, which is bias. Psychological research has not supported
the Intuitive Logics claim that scenarios imagined creatively should be expected to be
superior to scenarios developed analytically. Such bias operates at the levels of both
individuals and groups developing scenarios. Setting aside the potential problem of
active, conscious bias, psychologists have noted that unconscious bias in the holistic
judgments of complex systems is very real. At the level of individuals, this is because
the human mind is limited in its capability to process multifactor interdependencies,
and is easily distracted by trivial matters.
The late psychologist Dawes (1988) chronicled a number of cognitive biases that
are the result of biased heuristics; two that are directly relevant to Intuitive Logics are
availability and what is described by Morgan and Henrion (1990) as overconfidence.
Availability is the tendency to overestimate the probability of phenomena that are
familiar. A number of scholars have noted this tendency and dubbed it the ‘conjunc-
1 As Wolfgang Weimer-Jehle wrote, because the human mind “is limited in its capability of mentally
processing multifactor-interdependencies, a verbal analysis is not very suitable for the analysis of highly
complex problems” (2006, p. 335).
2 The U. S. National Park Service has engaged in climate change scenario exercises based on Intuitive
Logics (NPS, n. d.) where an additional level of matrices was embedded. This resulted in 16 different
scenarios rather than four, which is still a small sample. Nevertheless, the application of Intuitive Logics at
this level of sophistication is exceedingly rare.
123
Synthese (2014) 191:2049–2088 2057
tion fallacy’ (Schoemaker 1993; Tversky and Kahneman 1983). More specifically,
availability reflects the judgment that ever more detailed events are more likely than
less detailed ones; however, mathematically speaking, the opposite is true. For exam-
ple, consider the following experiment carried out by A. Tversky and D. Kahneman.
Study participants were presented with a personality sketch of a character named Linda
and then asked which of the following statements was more likely to be true: (a) Linda
is a bank teller, or (b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. The
vast majority of respondents (85 %) selected the second statement as more probable,
even though Linda’s membership to the plainly described set of ‘bank tellers’ will be
more likely than her membership to the conjoint of the sets ‘bank tellers’ and ‘active
feminists.’
The second key heuristic is overconfidence, which is the tendency to underesti-
mate the likelihood of outcomes perceived as extreme; in other words, under uncer-
tainty, people systematically report confidence intervals for their judgments that are
too narrow. This observation is based on a substantial body of literature regarding
how well-calibrated humans are as probability assessors. Such experiments would
ask study participants to report their degree of uncertainty about information that is
verifiable but not easy to recall (or perhaps simply unknown) for the study participant.
Examples of calibration questions include the populations of countries (verifiable by
consulting an almanac), dates of historical events (verifiable by consulting a history
book), or the meanings of unusual words (verifiable by consulting a dictionary or
appropriate glossary) (Morgan and Henrion 1990). In their summary of ten studies,
Morgan and Henrion showed a repeated pattern: When study participants reported
their highest confidence for an unknown quantity or definition (the 98 % confidence
interval), rather than being incorrect approximately 2 % of the time, respondents were
wrong anywhere from 5 to 50 % of the time (the median across studies being incorrect
responses with high confidence 30 % of the time).
The unconscious cognitive biases of availability and overconfidence are not limited
to isolated unknowns or simple statements in experimental settings. W. Grove and P.
Meehl also looked at errors in judgments in a variety of professional contexts, such as
likelihood judgments of parole violations or violent criminal recidivism, and psycho-
logical diagnoses of psychosis or neurosis. In their review of over 40 years of research
on the predictive power of clinical versus mechanical methods, they concluded,
The clinical method relies on human judgment that is based on information con-
templation and, sometimes, discussion with others …. The mechanical method
involves a formal, algorithmic, objective procedure (e.g., [an] equation) to reach
the decision. Empirical comparison of the accuracy of the two methods ([based
on] 136 studies over a wide range of predictors) shows that the mechanical
method is almost invariably equal to or superior to the clinical method (quoted
in Dawes 2001, p. 2049).
It is notable that Grove and Meehl state that “discussion with others” does not correct
for individual judgment errors. This refers to a well-documented problem known as
groupthink. There are serious problems that arise when groups deliberate with the
aim of reaching consensus on a difficult topic. The most serious is that group delib-
eration “often produces worse decisions than can be obtained without deliberation”
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(Solomon 2006, p. 31). As Morgan and Henrion put it in the context of groups trying to
arrive at agreed-upon probabilistic judgments, there is “considerable evidence that…
face-to-face interaction between group members can create destructive pressures of
various sorts, such as domination by particular individuals for reasons of status or
personality unrelated to their ability as probability assessors“ (Morgan and Henrion
1990, p. 165).
As philosopher of science Miriam Solomon describes this evidence, peer pressure,
pressure to reach consensus, subtle pressures from those in authority, and the salience
of particularly vocal group members who may anchor decisions, can lead dissenting
individuals to change their minds, and significantly, not to share their knowledge of
contrary evidence. These factors can lead groups into making poor decisions and to
reduce their options. Importantly, writes Solomon, it does “not help much if individuals
‘try harder’ to be unbiased or independent; we are unaware of, and largely unable to
resist, the social factors causing groupthink and related phenomena” (2006, p. 32).
She cites James Surowiecki: “Too much communication, paradoxically, can actually
make the group as a whole less intelligent” (2004, p. xix).
In case there is any doubt that these biases appear to affect complex socioeconomic
scenario modeling as standardly performed for climate change research, one need
look no further than the experience of long-term (i.e. multi-decadal) energy demand
forecasting. ‘Best estimates’ for such forecasts at the national level have been con-
sistently wrong (O’Neill and Desai 2005; Shlyakhter et al. 1994), at times off by a
factor as large as four (Smil 2003 cited in Morgan and Keith 2008). Although it is
unclear to what extent Intuitive Logics were integrated into such forecasts, they were
certainly produced with complex simulations, where judgments had to be applied by
modelers to different combinations of model assumptions. With the forecasts being
consistently wrong, this is congruous with the aforementioned cognitive bias of over-
confidence, since the ‘best’ forecasts were spectacularly wrong well over 2 % of the
time. Morgan and Keith also argued that there is evidence that the cognitive bias of
availability was at play, since projections for primary energy demand in the US for
the year 2000—produced even as recently as 1980—systematically underestimated
the uptake of energy efficient technologies. Such a serious oversight would have been
consistent with past experience, since prior to 1980, energy efficiency was a low pri-
ority due to low energy prices. However, much of the decrease in US primary energy
use from 1980 to 2000 is explained by the wide adoption of more efficient technolo-
gies. Thus the results from complex scenario modeling will only be as good as their
input assumptions, which, we argue, will further be limited by the ability to correct
for cognitive biases on the part of the modeler.
Thus, while there are benefits to using the Intuitive Logics approach, when doing it
for predictive/anticipatory scientific work, it may not be optimal. The goals and uses
of scenarios for assessment bodies such as the IPCC demand more scientific, more
objective approaches only now emerging.
4 An alternative scenario-building approach: the CIB method
In contrast to the Intuitive Logics approach, under which various experts are assembled
to estimate uncertainties, driving forces, and narratives through dialogue as a group,
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other scenario approaches exist that are more systematic. In this paper, the specific
method we contrast with Intuitive Logics is an example of a systematic approach and
is called Cross-Impact Balance (CIB) analysis. The CIB method was selected because,
as discussed in Sect. 1.1, it would be an appropriate substitute to Intuitive Logics in
the Story and Simulation approach (Kosow 2011). Additionally, its inner workings are
publicly accessible, which is an important aspect of its overall objectivity (discussed
in more detail in Sect. 5).
4.1 Introduction to CIB analysis
Like Intuitive Logics, the whole point of doing a CIB analysis is to arrive at narrative
descriptions for alternative scenarios that are plausible. The ultimate aim of the CIB
method is “a more promising division of labor between man and method” (Weimer-
Jehle 2006, p. 338). It revolves around collecting pairwise semi-quantitative judgments
from experts about relationships, influences, and correlations between driving forces,
gathered in a transparent and orderly way. These judgments—for example, concerning
the socioeconomic determinants of greenhouse gas emissions—can then be used to
generate a very large number of scenarios (as opposed to only four under the Intuitive
Logics approach) whose respective levels of internal consistency can be evaluated
with a simple mathematical algorithm.3 A significant virtue of the CIB method is that
the internal consistency of possible futures can be measured. Additionally, internally
consistent futures are discovered by systematically scanning very large numbers of
scenarios (on the order of 10 billion4), which can better ensure that important surpris-
ing, unexpected scenarios are not overlooked, as they might be through the Intuitive
Logics method.5
CIB differs from Intuitive Logics by explicitly representing judgments about dis-
tinct scenario variables, their alternative outcomes, and the relationships among the
alternative outcomes of the variables. These judgments can be collected from experts
or gathered through literature review. The collected judgments are then used to evalu-
ate the internal consistency of any particular scenario consisting of those variables and
alternative outcomes. Thus in CIB, what makes a scenario plausible is not a subjective
judgment of the scenario authors but instead its demonstrated internal consistency. In
the case of global socioeconomic scenarios, such variables could be average global
3
“Cross-impact analysis represents a schema for collating and systematizing […] expert judgments,
so as to make it possible to construct a conceptual substitute, however imperfect, for a wished-for but
nonexistent theory of how events affect one another in a multidisciplinary context” (Olaf Helmer [11], cited in
Weimer-Jehle 2006, p. 336).
4 Much of the time, scenario descriptions are general rather than highly detailed (cf. the IPCC scenarios
in Sect. 3.1). Under those circumstances, all scenario descriptions of interest that are possible from a
combinatorial perspective may be fewer than 10 billion. Under such conditions, the CIB method is able to
comprehensively scan all scenarios that are combinatorially possible.
5 As noted by Postma and Liebl (2005), “…[I]t is striking how often situations occur that were simply not
included or were excluded as ‘logically impossible’ or ‘inconsistent’ during the process of scenario building.
… If scenarios, based on the conventional concept of straightforward, nonparadoxical trends and/or simple
dichotomies, ignore trends transgressing boundaries and contexts, they are not helpful in exploring the
future but rather tend to produce misleading results” (p. 167).
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wealth level=high, average educational attainment across the globe=high, global
population= low. For any CIB analysis, the following three steps must be completed:
Step 1: Specification of scenario variables and their alternative outcomes. CIB analy-
sis requires specific judgments about system dynamics. Therefore specifying sce-
nario variables and their alternative outcomes, or states, is required. For example,
let us consider a simple scenario consisting of only three variables conceptualized at
a highly aggregated scale (such as at a global or continental-region level): popula-
tion, income per capita, and educational attainment defined as the proportion of the
population with post-primary education. In this example, let us consider three possible
states for each variable: low, medium, or high.
Step 2: Collecting judgments for relationships among the variables and their alterna-
tive outcomes. Once the scenario context, or system, has been defined, the variables
and their states can be organized in a cross-impact matrix, as shown in Fig. 2. This
organization is useful for systematically recording judgments about how any given
variable state would be expected to directly influence target states for other variables.
Rows represent given states, or variable states that would exert an influence upon each
intersecting state across columns. Columns represent target states, or variable states
that would receive influences. In other words, rows represent variable states acting as
impact sources and columns represent variable states acting as impact sinks.
The cells of the CIB matrix contain numerical judgments about how variable states
in the rows (or impact sources) exert direct influences on variable states in the columns
(or impact sinks). For each cell in a judgment section (circled in Fig. 2), one considers
the cross-impact question,
If the only information you have about the system is that [given variable] X has
state x, would you evaluate the direct influence of X on [target variable] Y as a
clue that [variable] Y has state y (promoting influence) or as a clue that [variable]
Y does not have state y (restricting influence)? (Weimer-Jehle 2006, p. 339)
For example, the number recorded in the cell labelled in Fig. 2 pertains to the direct
influence of a high outcome given for income per capita upon the medium target
outcome for educational attainment. Judgments can then be recorded according to
an ordinal scale, where positive scores represent ‘promoting’ influences and negative
scores ‘restricting’ influences. The stronger the direct influence, the greater the mag-
nitude of the judgment. A judgment of 0 indicates that given variable state x has no
direct influence on target variable state y.
Step 3: Evaluating the internal consistency of scenarios. In CIB analysis, internal
consistency for any scenario is determined by a logical check for self-consistency
(Weimer-Jehle 2006). Self-consistency is an important property for stable scenarios
(von Reibnitz 1988), or scenarios that describe long-term trends, which is precisely
what socioeconomic scenarios in climate change research aim to do. In CIB analysis,
each variable outcome in a given scenario is associated with a set of direct influences,
which is represented by a subset of the expert judgments (see the shaded rows in Fig. 2).
Whenever some given combination of outcomes evokes a set of direct influences that
also promote the said combination, the scenario has demonstrated its self-consistency
and is deemed internally consistent. Scenarios that fail the self-consistency test could
do so for a number of reasons: They could be highly unlikely (on empirical or the-
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Fig. 2 A cross-impact matrix for the simple scenario example of population, income per capita, and edu-
cational attainment conceptualized at a highly aggregated level. Numerical judgments are from Schweizer
and O’Neill (2013). Highlighted rows correspond to influences associated with the following combination
of outcomes: low global trend for population, high global trend for income per capita, and low global trend
for educational attainment. The mismatch of outcomes that correspond to self-consistency (downward and
upward facing arrows at bottom of figure) and impact balances indicate that this is an inconsistent scenario
oretical grounds), physically impossible, or logically inconsistent. The mathematical
algorithm employed for CIB does not distinguish between these reasons for failing
the self-consistency test, as the result is always the same: The direct influences unique
to P = −P , where P is some assumed scenario. Since P = −P is a contradiction,
all scenarios that fail the self-consistency test are considered internally inconsistent
to some degree (which some might interpret as a measure of lower likelihood), which
can be quantified with an inconsistency score. Here, we present an example of this
consistency assessment with the three socioeconomic variables population, income
per capita, and educational attainment. This particular example is based on Schweizer
and O’Neill (2013), where educational attainment is defined as the percentage of the
global population with post-primary education.
As shown in Fig. 3, an example of an internally consistent combination of outcomes
for these socioeconomic variables appears on the left in case (a). The scenario would
be high educational attainment, high income per capita, and low population. This
is because the direct influences between these trends at highly aggregated scales are
relatively well understood, and the set of influences can be shown to be self-consistent.
For this simple case, when educational attainment trends are high, one could expect
the outcome for average income per capita to also be high. When income trends and
educational attainment trends are both high, one could expect the population trend to be
low.6 Low trends for population might also weakly encourage the high trend for average
6 Some readers may note that the relationship between income, education level, and population growth
depends upon economic and educational opportunities for women. In this regard, general trends for global
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Fig. 3 Examples of simple scenarios that are internally consistent (left) and inconsistent (right). The
internally consistent scenario evokes a network of self-consistent influences, while the inconsistent scenario
does not. Reproduced with permissin from Schweizer and O’Neill (2013, p. 6)
income per capita. The high income trend also encourages continued high educational
attainment. Thus this combination of outcomes for the socioeconomic variables passes
the self-consistency test and would constitute a scenario that is internally consistent.
Consider now a slightly different combination, one where educational attainment
is low, income per capita is high, and population is low. In case (b), in Fig. 3, it can be
seen that this combination is no longer self-consistent, as low trends for educational
attainment would not be expected to encourage the high trend for average income
per capita nor the low trend for population. Similarly, for reasons previously stated, a
high trend for income per capita would not be expected to encourage a low trend for
educational attainment. Because this combination of outcomes does not pass the test
for self-consistency, it is an example of a combination that is internally inconsistent.
CIB analysis can record a score for the severity of the internal inconsistency of a
scenario. A general property of inconsistent scenarios is that some (if not all) of the
associated influences are not self-consistent. For each scenario possible, CIB analy-
sis records an inconsistency score by measuring the worst discrepancy between the
self-consistency assumption and the net tendency of the influences associated with
the given scenario. Inconsistency measurement is made possible by the quantified
Footnote 6 continued
income per capita and educational attainment may be insufficient for drawing conclusions about global
population level. Although we acknowledge this criticism, we also note that this scenario example was
inspired by an actual study that applied the CIB method to socio-economic scenarios for IPCC assessments
(Schweizer and O’Neill 2013). In the IPCC context, national governments approve the contents of the
executive summaries of Assessment Reports. Additionally, from an international relations perspective, the
issue of gender equity is controversial. For this reason, such explicit language regarding gender would not
appear in descriptions of socioeconomic scenarios. Instead, the fact that general global trends in income
growth and educational attainment leave room to suggest that women overall are also receiving more income
and education is an accepted ambiguity.
123
Synthese (2014) 191:2049–2088 2063
pairwise judgments for direct influences between variable states. Thus the matrix in
Fig. 2 also acts as a database for sets of influences that would be associated with any
particular given scenario (see shaded rows) and can demonstrate the simple mathemat-
ical calculations performed on values in the matrix to obtain the internal consistency
score for any scenario.
To provide an example of inconsistency scoring, we will consider the scenario
depicted in Fig. 3, case (b). The combination of outcomes for this scenario is low
trend for population, high trend for income per capita, and low trend for educational
attainment. In Fig. 2, the highlighted rows correspond to the set of influences that would
be associated with this combination of outcomes. Each possible target outcome for
each variable, which is represented in each column, is influenced to a different extent
by the outcomes in the given scenario. To uncover the net effect of the given scenario,
quantities for the direct influences upon each target outcome must be combined. Impact
balances shown at the bottom of Fig. 2 sum the relevant given influences together for
each target outcome. Thus the net effect of the given scenario is revealed by the set
of impact balances for each target element. For each target element, the maximum
impact balance corresponds to the target outcome that is most strongly promoted. The
upward facing arrows at the bottom of Fig. 2 show the expected target outcomes for
each element according to the given scenario. These outcomes are compared to the
initially assumed, given scenario (downward facing arrows at the bottom of Fig. 2).
The inconsistency score for the given scenario is the maximum difference between
the outcome according to impact balances and the outcome for self-consistency. For
this reason, perfectly internally consistent combinations, which meet the condition of
self-consistency, always have an inconsistency score of 0. For the example in Fig. 2,
the given combination is internally inconsistent and has an inconsistency score of 33
(33 = 13−(−20)). This result was expected even before any quantities were assigned
to the influences in the given combination (cf. Fig. 3).
Since inconsistency scoring can be done for any scenario, large numbers of sce-
narios can be scored and then ranked. This provides groupings for scenarios that have
good or poor internal consistency. Groups of scenarios with good internal consistency
could be more closely investigated to uncover their specific variable states as well as
the specific variable interrelationships that make the scenarios self-consistent. Such
scenarios would be considered highly plausible.
In short, to make the distinctions between the CIB and Intuitive Logics methods
exceedingly clear, CIB elicits from experts pairwise judgments for correlations and
mutual influences among scenario variables. A cross-impact matrix, such as the one
shown in Fig. 2, can be used to collect such judgments. With the above example of
a simple scenario for alternative outcomes for global population, global income per
capita, and global educational attainment, CIB elicits judgments about the interre-
lations of these variables and their alternative outcomes in a pair-wise fashion by
asking experts to record their judgments in matrix cells. A mathematical algorithm
then processes these numerical judgments to search for internally consistent com-
binations of outcomes for the three scenario variables. In contrast, Intuitive Logics
elicits holistic, aggregate judgments for plausible scenarios by asking experts in a
focus group setting, “Consider a future context where the world is globalized and
focused on sustainable development [this hypothetical context is drawn from Fig. 1].
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What scenario for global population, global income per capita, and global educational
attainment would be plausible in that context?” The group of experts would then dis-
cuss outcomes that they find plausible and come to a consensus. This scenario context
question would then be repeated to the group for the three alternative future contexts
according to an Intuitive Logics matrix, such as that shown in Fig. 1. Thus CIB is a
semi-quantitative procedure, while Intuitive Logics asks for a verbal analysis.
4.2 Strengths of CIB analysis
There are three major strengths to CIB analysis, which we discuss in this section.
First, the CIB method makes it possible to inspect experts’ judgments as well as
specific variable interrelationships that make scenarios plausible. Second, it shares
the benefit of ‘imagination’ with Intuitive Logics—that is, possible futures that are
highly contrasted from each other and from the present are identified. Third, the CIB
method demonstrates the internal consistency (or lack thereof) of scenarios. It can
also demonstrate that internally consistent scenarios were identified from a scan of a
very large number of scenarios (on the order of 10 billion). By design, the manner
in which CIB demonstrates internal consistency diminishes the influence of cognitive
limitations on storyline scenarios. Each of these strengths is elaborated below.
The first significant virtue of the CIB method permits the analysts, experts, and any
member of the public (that is, any party who did not participate directly in developing
the scenarios) to examine how the conclusions of a particular analysis were arrived
at. More specifically, in comparison to Intuitive Logics, CIB represents and preserves
for open viewing the networks of direct influences for any scenario (as the reader can
see in Sect. 4.1) as well as explores a very large number of scenarios possible. These
strengths are direct improvements to two limitations of Intuitive Logics: (i) ensuring
internal consistency in the face of complexity and (ii) under-sampling the vast space
of possible futures.
The second major strength of CIB is similar to the ‘imagination’ benefit of Intuitive
Logics. An important objective of scenario analysis is exploration, as scenarios can
potentially help users consider surprising developments or discontinuities (Bradfield
et al. 2005; EEA 2009). At first blush, one might question whether the results of
a CIB analysis would hew too closely to extrapolating past trends, especially with
the simple population example discussed previously to introduce CIB. But actually,
the CIB method facilitates discovery and exploration in major ways, which is made
clear by a recent application in a more sophisticated scenario analysis (Schweizer and
O’Neill 2013). The sophisticated application, which shows the full strengths of CIB
in practice, is discussed below. By systematically exploring a much larger space of
possible scenarios (which, under the conditions of many scenario studies, may span the
full space of scenarios combinatorially possible; see Sect. 4.1, footnote 4), we find that
the CIB method can explore further than Intuitive Logics by uncovering unexpected
combinations of possible outcomes.
Consider a new application of the CIB method to climate scenarios by Schweizer
and O’Neill (2013). They first surveyed a range of researchers to establish which
socioeconomic variables should be prioritized in the IPCC’s new socioeconomic sce-
narios. They then used the resulting set of 13 factors (some of which are currently
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not represented in any IA models featured in IPCC reports) as a basis for a further
elicitation of expert opinion regarding the correlations and influences of these factors
upon each other. The CIB matrix, consisting of 13 ×13 factors, each with three possi-
ble outcomes—specifically, low, medium, or high long-term trends—required 1,404
judgments. The matrix was sufficiently large that the authors elicited judgments from
a variety of researchers concerning only the segments of the matrix involving their
expertise. They followed a judgment protocol developed by Schweizer and Kriegler
(2012), on which they briefed experts on prior to the elicitation. Schweizer and O’Neill
(2013) found that experts were able to provide 108 judgments each in about one hour.
Some were able to provide more (216 judgments) in the same amount of time. [Further
details about the elicitation of expert judgments are available in Schweizer and O’Neill
(2013).] Compare this to developing scenarios under the Intuitive Logics approach,
where experts typically participate in a multi-day workshop and may have to travel a
great distance to participate.
The resulting CIB analysis, which explored the consistency of all possible com-
binations of the 13 variable values and trends, resulted in approximately 1.5 million
scenarios. Schweizer and O’Neill (2013) then focused on the 1,000 most consistent
scenarios as evaluated by the decomposed judgments collected independently from a
variety of experts. Their analysis revealed some surprises about the five new archetypes
for socioeconomic scenarios that are of interest to the IPCC (O’Neill et al. 2013). Sig-
nificantly, these most consistent combinations were interestingly different from one
another in how they achieved the final state of the future. One of the most interesting
and surprising of their results is that a new socioeconomic factor, ‘quality of gover-
nance,’ seems to play a key role in future outcomes for ‘socioeconomic challenges to
adaptation.’ In this context, adaptation refers to the ability of societies to implement
responses to a changing climate that moderate harm or take advantage of benefits.
The factor ‘quality of governance’ was introduced as a new socioeconomic variable
because it was prioritized among 25 independent experts in an online survey. For the
more detailed expert elicitation, ‘quality of governance’ was then defined in accor-
dance with the six Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by the World Bank
(World Bank 2011). Examples of Worldwide Governance Indicators include Politi-
cal Stability and Absence of Violence as well as Control of Corruption. Independent
experts specializing in a variety of fields (e.g. demography, economics, agricultural
economics, education) reported that they would expect quality of governance, as a
socioeconomic factor, to interact directly with outcomes for their respective socioe-
conomic factors.
This particular finding is significant for two reasons. First, socioeconomic sce-
narios for climate change research have traditionally described trends in governance
and overarching policy priorities superficially—in the words of Lee Lane and David
Montgomery, “seem[ing] to float in thin air without grounding in theory or data” (2012
ms., p. 6). To be fair, dynamics that could represent changes in governance have been
challenging to incorporate in many IA models (Costanza et al. 2007). Additionally,
Schweizer and Kriegler (2012) point out that one of the main purposes of storylines is
to represent contextual details for scenarios that models do not, or cannot. Thus the lack
of experience with modeling governance may have motivated the relegation of such
details to intuitively derived storylines. However, the CIB results show that regardless
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of the reasons for these cursory treatments, this practice may no longer be acceptable.
This is because quality of governance may be a significant driver for socioeconomic
outcomes that make successful adaptation to climate change more difficult. Therefore,
in scenarios for climate change research, representations of governance may demand
better grounding in data and theory.
Second, and perhaps even more surprisingly, the CIB analysis arrived at this result
with the vast majority of its judgments supplied independently by disciplinarily diverse
experts who do not model ‘quality of governance’ quantitatively but can appreciate
its influences qualitatively. In other words, this finding is remarkable because most of
the experts who provided judgments had no experience in how to formally represent
governance in their own modeling, and all experts’ judgments were collected indepen-
dently. Here we see the invaluable contribution of the CIB methods as compared to
results from Intuitive Logics: CIB can elicit ‘odd’ or ‘marginalized’ information about
a scenario—in this case, the socioeconomic variable, ‘quality of governance,’ which
turned out to be extremely significant to the dynamics of the scenarios overall. The
information that led to this conclusion arose though a process that fulfilled the three
conditions for groups to make good judgments, namely independence, diversity, and
decentralization, qualities that are enacted with CIB methods. In contrast, such mar-
ginalized information is almost inevitably lost in the Intuitive Logics process, simply
due to the group dynamics, as we shall discuss in Sect. 5.2.
The third and final major strength of the CIB method is that internal consistency
scoring is possible for a very large number of scenarios [in the studies by Schweizer
and Kriegler (2012) as well as Schweizer and O’Neill (2013), such internal consis-
tency scoring was achieved for all scenarios possible combinatorially]. Through this
more comprehensive scoring and scenario comparison, CIB provides a thoroughgoing
and much more complete check on internal consistency that is not available through
Intuitive Logics. Additionally, the scoring algorithm takes pressure off any expert
brains contemplating specific socioeconomic futures to test consistency, and puts it
on computers that effortlessly check large numbers of scenarios for the desired con-
sistency. Bearing in mind the cognitive burdens and biases associated with Intuitive
Logics, which will be examined further in Sect. 5, off-loading the holistic information-
processing job from the human brain and onto a computer significantly diminishes the
influence of cognitive biases on scenarios.
4.3 Limitations of CIB analysis
However, of course there are some limitations of CIB analysis. Although the method
is flexible, the number of variables that can be taken into account will be limited
for practical reasons. More specifically, current computing power limits the ability
of CIB analysis to investigate more than 10 billion (1010) scenarios comprehensively
(Weimer-Jehle 2010). Therefore, if one is interested in a comprehensive scan of all
scenarios possible combinatorially, CIB can only be used for scenarios that can be qual-
itatively understood with a moderate number of variables and alternative outcomes.7
7 A German public health study on obesity (Weimer-Jehle et al. 2012) applied CIB to 43 scenario factors,
each with two alternative outcomes. In this case, a comprehensive scan of all combinatorial possibilities
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For this same reason, one can only construct what its originator calls “rough scenar-
ios” (Weimer-Jehle 2006, p. 359). Weimer-Jehle, the originator of the CIB method,
also notes that since expert data not only supplies the information for the pairwise
judgments but also structures the logic of the system itself, CIB analysts should keep
the uncertainties surrounding such data firmly in mind. Because the analysis relies
so completely on expert judgments, it is crucial that those judgments be gathered in
such a way that they are serious and carefully considered, and not “the result of little
reflected guessing” (Weimer-Jehle 2006, p. 359; see Sects. 3.1 and 3.2).8
An additional possible drawback to the CIB approach is that it may be more demand-
ing for the analyst, or party convening the scenario exercise, than the Intuitive Logics
method: Surveys of experts take time, effort, and commitment of the CIB analysts, plus
the cooperation and commitment of experts completing the surveys. All of this, versus
the relatively simple task of inviting experts together for a workshop or meeting to
discuss a variety of possible scenarios—as is done for the Intuitive Logics approach—
seems to require a distinct difference of effort by the conveners of the two approaches.
In addition, it is possible that more is demanded of the experts in question; in the
CIB method, they are put on the spot and asked to semi-quantify forced judgments
in pairwise interactions or correlations, which can be a daunting task in comparison
to an open discussion of the same. On the other hand, much is also demanded of
experts in the Intuitive Logics method; they are required to entertain various large-
scale collections of variables in alternate global scenarios. It may be too early to say
which approach is more demanding, but the CIB method, as carried out in the climate
case by Schweizer and O’Neill (2013), proved to be fairly demanding, as it required
developing instruments and protocols to define the scope of the scenarios as well as to
collect 1,404 distinct judgments, recruitment of experts to participate in the exercise
asynchronously, and data entry of the experts’ responses into a CIB software package.
We may wish to say that this level of detail is actually the strength of the approach;
nevertheless, that does not change the fact that it is costly to achieve.
5 Meanings of ‘objectivity’ as the criteria for distinguishing superior scenario
generation methods for scientific assessments
Because scenarios in IPCC assessments aim to convey scientifically credible informa-
tion, we contrast the Intuitive Logics and CIB methods with respect to the criteria of
objectivity. We chose these criteria because objective methods in science are custom-
Footnote 7 continued
was not achievable (243 = 8.8 × 1012 possible scenarios), so a Monte Carlo CIB analysis was performed
instead.
8 One might ask if Intuitive Logics approaches are subject to the same demand. We contest that they are not
to the same degree, for the same reason that the shape of a two-dimensional mathematical function sketched
on a chalkboard has the luxury of being less thought-out than a precise and accurate version of the same
function plotted on graph paper. In the latter case, the requirement to quantify more characteristics of the
function—such as drawing it to scale—introduces new demands for reflection that are not present in the more
intuitive context. In addition, Intuitive Logics approaches have no mechanical method for distinguishing
the plausibility of scenarios, while CIB does for inconsistency scoring. Thus, in order for CIB inconsistency
scores to be meaningful, attention must be paid to collecting meaningful pairwise judgments.
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arily taken to provide a path to understanding real and independently-existing things,
properties, and processes.
5.1 Different meanings of objectivity
There are several quite distinct meanings of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’
that have been explored in detail by philosophers of science such as Helen Longino,
Heather Douglas, and Elisabeth Lloyd. Thus, ‘objective’ may mean: (1) public, (2)
detached, (3) unbiased, which are methodologically oriented. Two additional meanings
are more metaphysically oriented: (4) independently existing from us, and (5) real or
“really real” (Lloyd 1995).9 Additionally, objectivity often makes reference to social
operations and relations, which include (6) procedural objectivity and (7) interactive
or structural objectivity (Douglas 2004; Longino 1990). We shall examine the CIB
and Intuitive Logics approaches with respect to each of these meanings of ‘objective’
and ‘objectivity’ in Sect. 5.2, following our introductory discussion of each of these
meanings here in more detail.
The term ‘objective’ sometimes means (1) public, publicly accessible, observable,
or intersubjectively or publicly available for inspection, at least in principle.10 In
other words, an object or action is ‘objective’ (1) when it is performed, perceived, or
existing in open view, or openly accessible. Scientists are often very concerned about
this methodological form of objectivity, due to its importance in persuading others,
and its role in the public accessibility of scientific evidence.
Alternatively, ‘objective’ also sometimes means (2) detached, disinterested, inde-
pendent from will or wishes, or impersonal (Douglas 2004; Lloyd 1995). In detached
objectivity (2), one’s values should not blind one to the existence of unpleasant
evidence, because one is invested in a particular view (Douglas 2007, p. 133).
This meaning is closely related to another, that is, (3) unbiased. To clarify, if a person
is being objective (3) in the sense of ‘unbiased,’ then she can be making mistakes,
but they will fall randomly with relation to the outcome of interest, and not lean in a
particular direction. The notion of being unbiased here is basically statistical. A person
can have a stake in the outcome of events and still be unbiased. For example, a father
can hope that it doesn’t rain at his daughter’s wedding, and thus fail to be detached
or disinterested, but still be unbiased, i.e., objective (3), in his estimation of this
result. Nevertheless, there are problems of cognitive biases, discussed earlier, which
do routinely affect our judgment. Even though a scientist may not lean in a particular
direction consciously, and may deliberately be committed to remaining unbiased,
biases such as availability and overconfidence can still affect the outcomes of a study
or experiment, because these mental processes are operating below the conscious level,
i.e., at the level where information is processed unconsciously. Such cognitive biases
are systematic, particular, and undesired. Because these psychological, unconscious
9 While ‘detached’ and ‘unbiased’ were presented as a single meaning of objectivity in Lloyd’s (1995),
she has since the December (1994) lecture at Pittsburgh’s Philosophy Department taught them as distinct.
In this paper, this distinction plays a significant role.
10 We do not think that these concepts are strictly identical in meaning, but rather, that they all appear as
closely related and common ideas associated with “objective” (see Longino 1990, p. 70; Lloyd 1995).
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biases that ordinarily affect our judgment are real, they should be taken into account
when setting up and evaluating judgments, and methods to evaluate judgments.
In sum, the first three meanings of ‘objective’—public, detached, and unbiased—
pertain to methodology; they are understood as ways that scientists can conduct inves-
tigations in order to gain access to scientific facts or truths.
Another meaning of ‘objective’ has more to do with the shape of reality itself:
independently or separately existing from us (4). It is distinct from the final meaning:
real, or really existing (5) (Lloyd 1995).11 You can tell the difference between inde-
pendently existing and real by considering dreams. They are real, they really exist,
but they do not exist independently from us. Scientists are usually in the business of
trying to discover or explore that which is real, and that which is independently exist-
ing from us, that is, things that are ‘out there in the world’: facts, events, mechanisms,
and processes.
There are long-standing philosophical disputes about whether and how science may
produce knowledge of independently existing things or processes—indeed, whether
there exist any at all—but we shall lay them aside for the much more modest purposes
of this paper (Boyd 1983; Fine 1986; Lipton 2004; Peirce 1878; van Fraassen 1980).
In a more pedestrian fashion, there is customarily understood to be a very important
but usually unspoken link between the first three meanings of ‘objective’ and the
next two: the first three, methodological meanings—public (1), detached (2), and
unbiased (3)—are believed to be the means and methods that lead to knowledge of
the next two, independently existing things (4) (should there be such) and real events,
mechanisms, and processes (5) (Lloyd 1995). Finally, the socially oriented meanings of
‘objectivity,’ procedural objectivity (6) and interactive or structural objectivity (7), can
be used to reinforce the methodological support provided by the first three meanings
of ‘objective.’
For example, consider procedural objectivity (6), which “occurs when a process is
set up such that regardless of who is performing that process, the same outcome is
always produced” (Douglas 2007, p. 134; drawn from Megill 1994; Porter 1992). Such
a socially organized processing of information, experiment, or devices will produce
reliable outcomes no matter who is doing the processing, or operating the method.
This forced anonymity or interchangeability of the processor precludes the individ-
ual processors’ biases and wishes from influencing the outcome of the process—no
matter what they are. Procedural objectivity thus embodies and reinforces two of the
previously discussed forms of ‘objective’: detached (2), i.e., disengagement from the
desired results, and unbiased (3), or being statistically neutral in terms of mistakes
made relative to a true value, due to the lack of influence of an experimenter’s own
conscious or unconscious biases. Thus, this type of processing, ‘procedurally objec-
tive’ processing, provides a set of extremely powerful virtues, which we will discuss
below in comparing CIB with Intuitive Logics.
Procedural objectivity (6) is also closely related to replicability, i.e., the repro-
ducibility of the same experiment, observational procedure, or process, for the pur-
11 Douglas (2007, p. 131) rejects the discussion of these sorts of meanings of objectivity, such as “being
independent of human thought,” as “functionally unhelpful” and “functionally useless,” since she sees them
as having no utility in scientific discussions, as they are metaphysical.
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poses of testing or confirming an idea, theory, model or hypothesis. Replicability is
a standard requirement in nearly every field of the empirical and some theoretical
sciences. The notion that other researchers or observers should be able to repeat a
set of instructions or procedures for measurement or observation, (i.e., participate in
procedural objectivity (6) regarding observations), and then reproduce relevantly sim-
ilar results as previous observers, is built into the notion of public objectivity (1), and
its central place in scientific methodology. Because replicability also involves having
other scientists perform ‘the same’ procedures, there is an assumption that the scien-
tists undergoing such a procedure will be objective in the sense of unbiased (3); it is
assumed that they will conduct the procedures fairly, and any mistakes will tend to fall
fairly to either side, and not be biased in one direction, i.e., objective (3), unbiased.
Finally, we consider ‘interactive,’ ‘structural,’ or ‘transformative’ objectivity (7),
the concept of agreement achieved by intense debate or discussion among peers in
the scientific community, where the emphasis is on the degree to which “both its pro-
cedures and its results are responsive to the kinds of criticisms described,” according
to Longino (1990, p. 76; see also Hull 1988). These criticisms include critiques of
evidence, experimental design, and theory, as well as background assumptions that
underpin all these factors. “Interactive objectivity occurs when an appropriately con-
stituted group of people meet and discuss what the outcome should be,” writes Douglas
(2007, p. 135). Such a social vision of objectivity requires a community of interlocutors
and also standards of their engagement.
In sum, adherence to the first three meanings of ‘objective’—the methodological
meanings, public, detached, and unbiased, [as well as replicability, which is made pos-
sible by the social-methodological meaning, procedural objectivity (6)]—is taken to
be important in the practice of most of the sciences; it is a promise to gain real knowl-
edge of reality itself.12 Whether adherence to meaning (7), interactive or structural
objectivity, is methodologically effective or not, gets at the core of the issues relating
to CIB versus Intuitive Logics methods in scenario building, which we discuss in the
next section.
5.2 Comparison of Intuitive Logics and CIB with respect to objectivity
Significantly, the CIB method is more objective than Intuitive Logics in several of
the distinct ways mentioned above. First, the CIB method has significantly more
(6) procedural objectivity, which finally makes it possible for the development of
storyline scenarios to be replicable. As discussed in the previous section, replicability
refers to the notion that other researchers or observers should be able to repeat a set
of instructions or procedures for measurement or observation, and then reproduce
relevantly similar results as previous observers. Here, CIB, which is procedurally
objective (6), and also virtually completely replicable thereby, wins out hands down
over Intuitive Logics, which, because it involves the vagaries of group interactions of
12 Because of widespread equivocation in philosophical discussion, this relationship is exceedingly rarely
spelled out, although Longino (1990) and Nozick (2001) discuss it.
123
Synthese (2014) 191:2049–2088 2071
human beings, is not replicable with regard to its results. This procedural objectivity
also enables the CIB method to be more ‘objective’ under other meanings of the term.
For instance, CIB is more ‘objective’ in the sense of being objective (1), public,
accessible, intersubjective, and publicly available for inspection. The Intuitive Logics
methods involve convening a small set of people, usually experts in various fields, to
build scenarios. In contrast, when one builds scenarios using a CIB methodology, there
could, in theory, be hundreds of experts providing documented input for scenarios.
Between these two methodologies, there is a sharp difference between the access that
others not present during the building of the scenario, such as outside policy-makers
and scientists, have to the information used to develop the scenarios, and the processing
of that information. More specifically, in the case of CIB methods, all of the expert
judgment values, as well as the final estimations of the internal consistency of the
scenarios, are objective (1), available for public access and inspection at any time.
In the Intuitive Logics case, in contrast, the final scenarios are available for public
inspection, as well as possibly some or all of the discussions leading to those final
scenarios, potentially through some transcript offering a narrative account, but no
calculations or estimations involving any complex correlations. In Intuitive Logics,
the complex expert judgments regarding the aggregate effects of variables affecting
the final scenarios, and especially their combinations and correlations, remain in the
experts’ minds completely inaccessible to the public, due to the fact that they are
not made explicit, nor are they explicitly calculated while narrative versions of the
scenarios are fleshed out.
Remember here that the CIB methods involve eliciting only pairwise expert judg-
ments regarding the pairwise correlations of two variables at a time, which avoid the
complex and concluding multi-variable judgments of the sort made in Intuitive Logics
contexts, which can involve as many as ten, fifteen or more correlated variables simul-
taneously. As we discussed above, the thoughts and judgments concerning complex,
aggregate sets of correlations among variables made in Intuitive Logics contexts are
not explicitly calculated by anyone in the Intuitive Logics discussions, and so remain
unavailable for public inspection at any time, and are thus not objective (1), accessible
and public, even if a meticulous narrative account is made available of the Intuitive
Logics process. The contrast between Intuitive Logics and the CIB methods is a stark
one: all of the expert judgments used in CIB calculations of the complex correlations,
interrelations between variables, and the grand conclusions regarding the consistencies
of a particular set of variables, are recorded explicitly and completely accessible and
available for public inspection, and thus objective in the public (1) sense. Meanwhile,
almost none of these are available in Intuitive Logics contexts, except for a few key
variables and the aggregate, general conclusions of the full storyline scenarios at the
end.
We would like to note a significant virtue of the CIB methods at this point, which
is unavailable to Intuitive Logics methods. In addition to being available to public
inspection, the expert pairwise judgments that contribute to the CIB analyses are
also easily challengeable and revisable at any time. That is, any judgments regarding
pairwise variable values recorded for a CIB analysis can be updated and modified
piecemeal, as new information or analyses develop, unlike the Intuitive Logics situ-
ations, which would require the re-convening of the entire expert panels. This makes
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the CIB methods more flexible and responsive to improvements in both data and the-
ory. The ease and openness of the judgments helps establish the ‘public’ objectivity
(1) of the CIB method, while also boosting the scientific credibility and power of the
method through its ability to handle new scientific evidence. Note that this ease of
revision also enhances structural objectivity (7). The community’s responsiveness to
criticism plays the vital role in this form of objectivity, and here we can see the CIB
method’s facilitation of the updating and criticism needed for objectivity (7) (Longino
1990).
Procedural objectivity (6) also enables CIB to be more objective under meaning
(2), more detached, as well as meaning (3), less biased. A given expert’s conscious
attachment or unconscious cognitive bias towards a given result or variable value is
muted by this method, through the procedure of having their expert opinion elicited
only about pairwise correlations between individual variables, and not about trends
or massive correlations between interdisciplinary collections of variables. The par-
ticular procedural objectivity of CIB bolsters the detached and less biased meanings
of objectivity in two ways. First, the expert’s possibly biased opinions involving the
direction of the change of the overall scenarios due to some particular factor(s) are not
counted or surveyed, or if untoward biases are included, they are visible and modifiable
by others. Second, the requirement that judgments used to arrive at full scenarios be
recorded pairwise is a disaggregation technique, and these have been shown to improve
the calibration of judgments of quantities unknown to participants in psychological
experiments but known in reality, such as “How many packs of Polaroid color film
were used in the USA in 1970?” (Armstrong 1978 cited in Morgan and Keith 2008;
MacGregor and Armstrong 1994 cited in Morgan and Keith 2008). The implication of
these studies is that for judgments of large, unknown quantities with high uncertainty
(and here it should be noted that socioeconomic scenarios include judgments about
ranges and rates of change for future, unknown quantities that span the globe as well
as large continental regions and sometimes countries), disaggregation of judgments
corrects for more of the individual cognitive biases discussed in Sect. 3.3, compared
to eliciting such judgments from individuals holistically.
With the Intuitive Logics methodologies, under which there is often unaided or
minimally aided (and always aggregate or holistic) judgment being elicited, it is a
situation in which biases may even be seen to be encouraged. With CIB, it is the oppo-
site. Through the requirement to record each expert’s judgments in each judgment
cell, unconscious cognitive bias is counteracted through disaggregation. Additionally,
through the public display of judgments in judgment cells, any personal and theoret-
ical biases are made more obvious. Thus, any untoward biases, whether unconscious
or conscious, can be managed and revealed through the process of recording disag-
gregated judgments and through comparisons with other expert judgments. Under
the Intuitive Logics methods, such biases are simply incorporated into the resulting
scenarios without any chance for piecemeal revision or improvement. Through pro-
cedural objectivity (6), the CIB approach thus leads to more detached and less biased
scenarios, that is, more ‘objective’ (2) and (3) scenarios.
Despite Intuitive Logics’ clear weaknesses for ‘objective’ meanings (1) public, (2)
detached, (3) unbiased, and (6) procedurally objective, Intuitive Logics’ proponents
may attempt to claim superiority with respect to ‘objective’ meaning (7), interactive or
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structural objectivity, due to its invitation to include a variety of experts as a group in
the scenario building process. As mentioned above, the details of group membership
and interactions are crucial for understanding interactive or structural objectivity (7).
For example, how diverse should the group be, and with what expertise? Both Intuitive
Logics and CIB are subject to the worry, “Whose judgments are behind the scenar-
ios?” Both methods also require the input of judgments from a variety of disciplines.
A big difference between the Intuitive Logics and CIB methods is that CIB makes
these judgments objective (1), publicly accessible, and able to be updated piecemeal,
as just discussed, while Intuitive Logics masks or precludes this ability by design.
Discussion of structural objectivity (7) for CIB is thus more compelling due to its
public accessibility (1).
A further issue facing any claims of structural objectivity (7) of Intuitive Logics is
that we have abundant reason for expecting problems of ‘groupthink’ biases, discussed
in 3.3, to arise in the context of Intuitive Logics scenario building. This is because
Intuitive Logics, unlike CIB, requires the direct, face-to-face interactions of a small
group of experts (Janis 1972).
Solomon’s analysis of why groupthink biases discussed in Sect. 3.3 work to lead
results astray is very interesting. She first summarizes Surowiecki’s discovery of three
important conditions for a group to make an epistemically good aggregate judgment:
independence, diversity, and decentralization. ‘Independence’ means that each person
makes a judgment on his or her own, while ‘diversity’ requires that the individuals
making the judgments are sufficiently diverse in both knowledge and perspective,
which varies case by case. Finally, ‘decentralization’ means that the actual process of
aggregating information treats each person’s judgment equally: no expert or authority
is more heavily weighted in the group.
Solomon then analyzes why this set of conditions is effective at producing the
epistemically superior outcomes that it does. Significantly, she notes that the various
pressures that are typical in group settings, reviewed above, as well as the salience of
vocal group members, can lead to the suppression of important information. Consider
the fact, she says, that aggregated individual judgments are often the best predictors,
and the fact that such aggregates include all of the opinions of the individuals in
the group, in their full diversity (2006, pp. 35–36). Such individual opinions “are
often based on particular pieces of information that may not be generally known,” she
writes (2006, p. 36). It is when these individuals in their full diversity are overruled
or suppressed by groupthink, Solomon argues, that information is lost to the group. It
is in just this way that simple and plain aggregation preserves information that is lost
by group interaction, the latter of which therefore becomes ‘less intelligent.’ Solomon
sums up: “Dissent (i.e., different assessments by different individuals) is valuable
because it preserves and makes use of all the information available to the community”
(2006, pp. 36–37).
Now consider this sort of mechanism of aggregate knowledge production with
regard to the Intuitive Logics and CIB methods. Surowiecki’s three key requirements
for epistemically superior outcomes are: independence, diversity, and decentralization.
Our concern with the disappearance or neglect during analysis and deliberation of what
we can call ‘marginalized facts or judgments’—in brief, ‘marginalized information,’—
facts known by people in the group who are discouraged for whatever reason from
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voicing their knowledge through the means listed above—would apply to nearly all
Intuitive Logics scenario building methods.
These would be situations in which the requirements of ‘decentralization’ and
diversity have failed. Intuitive Logics methods are vulnerable to the various groupthink
biases mentioned above precisely because experts cannot relay truly independent judg-
ments, unless groupthink biases are successfully mitigated by some counter-method,
a topic we will discuss in a moment. The consequence is that not all knowledge rele-
vant to the outcome or judgments actually gets taken into consideration by the group,
which then leads to a clear failure of ‘decentralization.’ Contrast this with the situa-
tion with CIB, where even these ‘marginalized facts and judgments’ can get taken into
consideration; for example, even the most unpopular facts or judgments, those most
unpopular or obscure to leading voices and views within a controversial field, could
be equally weighted and compared with other, more popular views, in the processing
of information most relevant to the outcome being analyzed.
One might ask if Intuitive Logics approaches could correct for the dangers of group-
think with modifications such as the inclusion of an impartial moderator, and which
could also have the potential to protect the crucial ‘marginalized information.’ In this
regard, there are a variety of methods and suggestions designed to help groups over-
come or manage groupthink and related disabling biases, and all hark back to the three
conditions required for judgments from a group for attaining epistemically superior
outcomes. However, it appears to be difficult to successfully apply the suggestions for
making group interactions most effective. Unless the group follows some kind of struc-
tured procedure designed to avoid groupthink and other cognitive biasing phenomena
discussed earlier, their results are doubtful.
Such procedures include focusing on increasing the ‘diversity’ of group
membership—which is supposed to bring a diversity of distinct perspectives to the
discussions in the group—and active encouragement, rather than just tolerance, of
dissent (see Sunstein 2003; Surowiecki 2004). In a sense, dissent could be seen as
a particular type of ‘diversity’ within the group. However, this last can backfire, as
Janis, and Solomon, discuss. Some members of the group who are recognized as opin-
ion leaders may not be psychologically able to tolerate criticism or dissent; similarly,
dissent may demoralize or anger others, all of which may distract a group from its
original goals (Janis 1982, p. 252; Solomon 2006, pp. 32–33).
Recognizing that all deliberative efforts value group ‘diversity,’ let us consider other
methods that attempt to avoid groupthink biases by aiming to enhance other epistem-
ically important conditions. First, there is the Delphi method, where participants do
not initially meet face-to-face, but rather interact through an exchange of anonymous
assessments, sometimes supplemented by reasons for their opinions. Individual group
members are then given the opportunity to adjust their judgments in light of anony-
mous information collected from their peers. After a few iterations of collecting and
adjusting judgments from group members independently in this way, the group is con-
vened to react collectively to the information previously collected anonymously and to
arrive at a consensus (Dalkey 1969; Morgan and Henrion 1990 p. 165). Under the Del-
phi method, ‘independence’ is elevated by initially preventing the interaction of group
members; however, ‘independence’ is progressively diluted by asking experts to adjust
their judgments in light of their peers’ responses and by pursuing a consensus opinion.
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The Nominal Group Technique is also available, in which participants, as a group,
also begin deliberation by generating judgments quietly to themselves independently
but then quickly move to a group discussion that follows a structured format care-
fully designed to prevent any one person from dominating the proceedings. The final
assessments of alternatives discussed by the group are then made individually and
aggregated, such as through having each group member individually rank alternatives
and then having the moderator record which alternatives received the total highest
ranks (Gustafson et al. 1973). Under the Nominal Group Technique, there is also a
place for ‘independence,’ but more effort is focused on aiming for ‘decentralization’
in processing the judgments of the group. However, it is also questionable how well
‘decentralization’ is retained, since each member’s contribution to the group delibera-
tion naturally aims to persuade other group members to see the situation as the speaker
does.
Such procedures and variations on them have been formally tested and evaluated by
social psychologists seeking solutions to groupthink biases, but they have been found
to be ineffective, and little difference has been found among them. In the experiments,
interaction among the participants “of any kind seems to have increased overconfidence
and so worsened calibration” (Morgan and Henrion 1990, p. 165).
All of this explains why common modifications to natural group processes may
not be enough when they focus on ‘diversity’ (e.g. by encouraging dissent), ‘indepen-
dence’ (e.g. the Delphi method), or ‘decentralization’ (e.g. Nominal Group Technique)
to varying degrees; instead, we would likely need to have methods that provide all
three conditions simultaneously and invariably, because focusing on each condition to
different degrees at different stages in deliberation processes may not be effective for
overcoming the epistemic harms and disadvantages of groupthink biases. Although
we summarize here a few doubts that existing techniques to combat groupthink are
effective, it should be noted that currently, the Intuitive Logics groups contributing
to scenarios used by the IPCC are not using any of the aforementioned techniques to
combat groupthink and its concurrent loss of marginalized information.
Contrast the persistent problems of groupthink biases faced by Intuitive Logics with
the results found by Seaver cited on the same page of Uncertainty: “Seaver (1978)
found that simple mathematical aggregation with no interaction at all produced the
best results, although he points out that the experts have more faith in assessments
achieved through face-to-face interaction” (Morgan and Henrion 1990, p. 165). This
finding is similar to that of Grove and Meehl, discussed in Sect. 3.3, who compared clin-
ical versus mechanical methods, i.e. decisions based on subjective human judgments
(possibly combined with discussion) versus algorithmic, objective procedure. Thus,
CIB methods, with their solicitation of pair-wise variable judgments from diverse
experts on a one-by-one basis, and with complete independence, i.e., no need for
face-to-face interactions among experts, as well as its fully decentralized, mechani-
cal aggregation of all judgments, parallels Seaver’s zero-interaction results, and we
might similarly expect that it would produce epistemically superior outcomes all things
being equal, as Grove and Meehl, as well as Suroweicki, have found, and Solomon
argues.
It can be seen, then, that a kind of structural objectivity (7), sometimes claimed or
implied by Intuitive Logics in virtue of its inclusiveness of a variety of diverse experts,
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cannot be taken for granted—in fact, it may not be available to a meaningful extent at
all, because of the groupthink biases discussed above, which have been shown to be
difficult to mitigate by the variety of techniques so far offered.
Helen Longino set standards that should be met for interactions by scientific com-
munities to be objective (7), i.e., through structural or transformative objectivity, to
greater degrees, to the extent that they met these four standards: (a) Recognized avenues
for criticism; (b) Shared standards of evaluation; (c) Community response to criticisms;
(d) Equality of intellectual authority. Let us consider whether an Intuitive Logics group
is ordinarily set up with a Longinian setup, and can therefore take part in objectivity
(7), structural or transformative objectivity.
For Longinian objectivity (7), one of the keys to attaining scientific objectivity
is the structure of community standards and the transformative nature of criticism
through those channels, not as expressed in one decision or from one angle, but in
several or many, but still usually within one set of disciplinary practices. In addition,
we need equality of intellectual authority of a diversity of participants in order to truly
have a diversity of perspectives. Note that Longino’s objectivity structural objectivity
(7), is essentially a within-discipline notion of objectivity, and does not expand very
well or very clearly to a cross-disciplinary matrix or collection, without some careful
work, analysis, or reflection (see e.g., Hackett et al. 2008; Hackett and Rhoten 2009).
The CIB methods introduced in this paper are process and procedure-based methods
which neutralize both individual and groupthink biases, and would also neutralize
the groupthink biases that threaten the Longinian group-mediated objectivity (7) she
defends.
In sum, those promoting subjective methods, such as Intuitive Logics, have not
proposed a strategy to overcome the individual cognitive biases, and especially the
social groupthink biases, that cripple the consideration of significantly different sce-
narios. These facts alone raise questions about their claims of the superiority of their
less structured approaches. Thus, the proposed abandonment of the usual, unspoken
connection in scientific inference between objective methods [(1) public, (2) detached,
(3) unbiased, and (6) procedurally objective and therefore replicable procedures] and
increased knowledge of reality [(4) independently existing and (5) really real], seems
not to have much current evidence backing it up on the part of the Intuitive Log-
ics methodologists when considering CIB methods for scenario building in climate
change assessments.
Uncovering futures (or future states) that are both challenging for scenario modelers
and distant from their present circumstances is a primary goal of scenario building, and
it is essential to the success of surveying a range of emissions futures for the scientific
assessment process of the IPCC. However, a perennial and very grave problem in sce-
nario development is that participants have great difficulty imagining outcomes that
are very different from present experience. (See the discussion of cognitive limitations,
in Sect. 3.3.) The CIB method effectively neutralizes these cognitive limitations and
produces internally consistent futures that are sometimes surprising, simply by filling
in judgment cells in a matrix and then running the model. The CIB method is therefore
an extremely helpful tool in scenario development, since it overcomes psychological
and social limitations under which people tend to see familiar scenarios as more plau-
sible (and potentially more likely) than they actually are. The CIB method effectively
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neutralizes these biases by dividing the labor of human judgments and logical tests
for the internal consistencies of scenarios.
Altogether, as Solomon argued, methods such as those used in Intuitive Logics dis-
appear what we call ‘marginalized information.’ This refers to observations, data, and
judgments made unconsciously, or by individuals that are not represented in the final
group opinions or judgments in Intuitive Logics. The loss of such information is the
fundamental reason that such methods are documentably and in principle epistemically
inferior (Solomon 2006, pp. 36–37).
In addition, as discussed in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, Intuitive Logics opposes the assign-
ment of probability estimates to the various outcomes or futures, by design. In contrast,
by explicitly measuring the degrees of internal consistency of large numbers of scenar-
ios, CIB potentially offers such an option, for those for whom such information would
be useful, especially in planning. Such facts about the cognitive and social methods
themselves versus mechanical methods like CIB have shown that methods like CIB are
superior epistemically, just in terms of information elicitation and processing, as we
reviewed. We have discussed, moreover, how such epistemic superiority and related
features are associated with various meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity,’ very
significant concepts tied to scientific virtues that are important to the IPCC. This vari-
ety of reasons is why the IPCC is urged to prefer and adopt methods such as the CIB
methodology for creating socioeconomic scenarios.
6 In defense of Intuitive Logics: objectivity is unsuitable for the future
Some proponents of Intuitive Logics would argue that using objectivity, as we have, to
evaluate scenario methods is misguided. This is because the point of scenario analysis
is not to characterize a future that is bound to happen but to motivate preparedness
for a future that cannot be predicted. For instance, scenario analyst Cynthia Selin
noted, “Taking some sort of action … is the end goal of scenario exercises. Without
action, or promises of action, the scenario exercise is moot and irrelevant” (2006, p. 2).
Setting aside our arguments against the (7) structural objectivity of Intuitive Logics, the
emphasis on the purpose of scenarios for action, rather than objective characterizations
of the future, can pose challenges for the following meanings of objective: (2) detached
and (4) existing independently from us. As will be discussed further in this section,
the Intuitive Logics view also nullifies the applicability of objective meanings (3)
unbiased and therefore (6) procedural and (1) public meanings of objective.
Challenges to the relevance of the meanings of objective (2), detached, and (4),
independently existing from us, are rooted in the observation that socioeconomic
scenarios include human choices (Raskin et al. 2005). Thus the future does not exist
independently from us. The proverb fortes fortuna adiuvat (“fortune favors the bold”)
also reflects the view that one who is invested (rather than detached) is in a better
position to realize the future that is desired.
With these perspectives, the more appropriate methodological comparison for sce-
narios should be with respect to objective meaning (5) real—a real future, but one that
is also not independently existing from us. Furthermore, it follows that it would be
preferable for scenario users (and perhaps builders) to not be detached.
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Focusing on the irrelevance of objective meanings (4) independently existing from
us, and (2) detached, motivates differences over the relevance of objective meaning
(3) unbiased. On this point, Selin wrote,
Scenarios gain discursive power from their storied character and use of com-
pelling metaphors. … It is the realness, or the ready relation to one’s experience
of reality, that allows the [narrative] not to require justification because it is
witnessed as already trustworthy or valid. Rooting the scenarios in firmly held,
pre-existing beliefs or feelings about how the world works leads to the uptake
or credibility of the scenarios (2006, p. 10).
Similarly, Gregory argued,
Practitioners can find several advantages in using scenarios. First, they can use
scenarios to enhance a person’s or group’s expectancies that an event will occur.
This can be useful for gaining acceptance of a forecast. … Second, scenarios can
be used as a means of decreasing existing expectancies. … Third … scenarios
can produce greater commitment in the clients to taking actions described in
them (Gregory 2001 quoted in Morgan and Keith 2008, p. 204).
In response, Morgan and Keith noted,
Gregory supports these claims by citing much of the same literature that we
have described above (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). Surreptitiously shaping
someone’s views through such manipulation may be standard practice in political
or advertising settings. In our view, it is not appropriate in policy analysis, where
the objective should be to give analysts, planners and decision makers balanced
and unbiased assessments on which to base their decisions (2008, p. 204).
In Sect. 3.3, we similarly discussed relevant literature on the cognitive biases of avail-
ability and overconfidence. Moreover, we did so in the context of viewing such biases
as weaknesses of Intuitive Logics, just as Morgan and Keith do. Morgan and Keith
clarify that Intuitive Logics proponents instead see such cognitive biases as realities to
exploit for the purposes of easy psychological uptake of scenarios. Such a favorable
view of cognitive biases directly opposes that of psychologist Dawes (1988), who
has argued that appeals to one’s experiences of reality initiate the cognitive bias of
availability and can result in irrational choices.
In effect, this line of argumentation defending Intuitive Logics suggests that its non-
objective methods—that is, not detached and not unbiased (i.e., biased) methods—are
better ways to get at the real future, as it is not a thing, outcome, or result of processes
independently existing from us. Using this much narrower interpretation of objective
meaning (5), real things—which include dreams, fantasies, and fictional stories—one
may conclude that efforts to combat bias such as (6) procedurally objective methods
and requiring judgments to be objective under meaning (1), public, are also irrelevant.
Under this view, Intuitive Logics is the superior scenario method. This is because
Intuitive Logics has superior ease of use and can arrive at plausible, trustworthy sce-
narios much faster than daunting and slow analytically rigorous methods (e.g. CIB),
which, by putting so much effort into (1) public, (2) detached, (3) unbiased, and (6)
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procedural meanings of objective, distract from the main purpose of scenario exercises
anyway—inspiring action in the present to prepare for or influence the future.
7 Resolving the tension over objectivity for scenarios in climate change research
It is now clear that the conclusion for which scenario method is superior in climate
change research hinges upon which meanings of ‘objective’ are deemed relevant. It also
follows that the shape of the ‘future’ itself is contested—is it real and independently
existing, or is it real, but not independently existing from us? To arrive at the meanings
of objectivity that would be relevant, we begin with investigating the shape of the
‘future’ in the context of climate change research.
Consider (a) the future of a baseball hit by someone at bat, without any interven-
tion; this ball’s future is independently existing, subject only to physical laws. The
participation of the batter has already happened, and so is out of this picture, except as
his or her exercise of force on the ball at the beginning of this event. Now consider (b)
the future of a baseball hit by someone at bat—the exact same ball and batter—except
add the social context that it is during game 1 of the World Series; it’s future may
not be independently existing, when considering the social context and the outfield
potentially intercepting the ball. The future of the ball thus cannot be predicted purely
by administering the initial force of the batter onto the ball, because it might be inter-
fered with by a member of the opposing team, or by a fan. Specifically, what makes
the latter case unpredictable is the inclusion of various agents—will they respond to
the position of the ball over time, and if so, how will they? What are their abilities and
motivations in the social context?
As discussed at the start of the paper in Sect. 1, both general circulation models
and IA models answer questions of type (a), which project an independently existing
future that follows the trajectory initial conditions are already set upon. But situations
or questions of type (b) are also crucial, because they incorporate whether we actively
decide to change our present actions to different actions. The separation and interplay
of these two shapes of the future in global change research become more obvious
when one considers the language and analytical framework that surrounds the climate
change case.
Scientific communities take it as a scientific fact that the earth’s climate has under-
gone dramatic changes in the past before humans ever existed. Ice ages are a perfect
example. Thus general circulation models represent independently existing mecha-
nisms of the climate system such as Hadley cells (atmospheric circulation), thermoha-
line circulation (oceans), seasonal cycles and approximate lifetimes for the respiration
and transpiration of living plants and animals, stocks and flows of sea and land ice,
residence times of chemical compounds in different phases that are important for life
as well as the greenhouse effect (e.g. carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorous), and the
dynamics of clouds (hydrologic cycle). In the parlance of the community that studies
these natural processes, a goal of model development is to ever more accurately ‘hind-
cast’ (or replicate) known changes in earth’s historical climate. Models that do this well
are assumed to be valid representations of an independently existing climate system.
Scientists then consider different levels of ‘radiative forcing,’ which are imposed on
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this independently existing climate system by perturbations that are considered plau-
sible in the future. In climate change research, the forcings that are of high interest are
due to human activities.
Adding to this, the IA modeling community studies economic developments around
the world. Although this community studies coupled human and natural systems, their
analytical approach, which is rooted in economics, mirrors that of the independently
existing physical climate. Economic activity is defined by the production and con-
sumption of goods and services (and in climate change research, the production of
greenhouse gases as a byproduct is also relevant). IA models, to varying degrees,
represent the evolution of factors of production, such as land availability, wages, the
production and retiring of physical capital (e.g. multi-family housing), flows of finan-
cial capital (money), inventories of firms, energy demands, and food demands. The
evolution of these various stocks and flows are subject to market prices and taxes. In
a sense, the governing ‘law’ of how economies grow and contract, or why different
technologies come in or out of vogue, is governed by what Adam Smith famously
called the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. This very analogy signifies a particular view
of economic activity as being something much larger than any particular agent; in
effect, its tendencies or ‘inertia’ are sufficiently large that the global economy, as an
entity, can be conceptualized as independently existing.
One might contend that the IA view of economies is extremely unrealistic, as the
Great Recession (sparked by the financial crisis of 2007–2008) was the result of a
series of faulty human decisions. In spite of this, humans continued to intervene in the
faltering economy by bailing out large companies, lowering prime rates, and modifying
taxation and financial policies. Since human actions created quite an economic mess,
how would it be reasonable to expect more human action to fix the problem? The
answer lies in the field of quantitative policy analysis, which overlaps with the research
activities of the IA community.
Policies are analyzed in a trans-scientific fashion, where the analytical questions,
in the words of Alvin Weinberg, “can be stated in the language of science, [but] are
unanswerable by science” (1972, p. 209). Technically, policy analysis has many dif-
ferences from traditional science. Nevertheless, for policy decisions that are likely to
be improved by heeding the findings of scientists, the way quantitative policy analysts
think about their work is instructive. Policy options are considered ‘interventions’
to the status quo (i.e., the option of applying no new policy, or retaining ‘business
as usual’). This language reflects analytical and conceptual constructs in quantitative
policy analysis that are similar to how scientists think about their work, where they
perform experiments on an independently existing reality (e.g. a ‘control’ popula-
tion, ‘control’ conditions, a null hypothesis). Scientists believe they have arrived at
meaningful findings if they find sufficiently significant differences between the experi-
mental and control conditions. Policy analysts are similarly interested in a comparison
between the impacts of applying new policies versus retaining the status quo.
Unlike much science, where the differences between experimental and control pop-
ulations can be observed, the differences between hypothetical policies and retaining
the status quo can only be projected. Nevertheless, in policy analysis, it should be
noted that policy futures are characteristically different from the business-as-usual
future. For analytical purposes, the business-as-usual future is treated like the control
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in scientific experimentation. Thus the business-as-usual future has a similar function
to control conditions in scientific research, representing a reality considered ‘indepen-
dently existing’ for inferential purposes.
Turning our attention to the climate change case, climate researchers have a par-
ticular term for future projections that serve the analytical and inferential purposes of
the ‘control.’ Such projections are called ‘reference’ cases or scenarios. Depending on
the context for the questions being investigated by climate researchers, the reference
cases may be different things. Examples of reference cases, how they are used, and
their commonalities and differences across scientific sub-communities, can be seen in
the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007).
IPCC Assessment Reports consist of contributions from three working groups
(WGs) representing broad communities of research: physical climate science (WG
I); impacts of and vulnerability to a changing climate, as well as adaptation to climate
change (WG II); and mitigation of climate change (WG III). From the perspective of
WG I, the reference case should be a climate system that has received little radiative
forcing. For this reason, in the Fourth Assessment Report, WG I chose the artificial
case of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases being stable at year 2000
levels for the remainder of the twenty-first century. This artificial case (the control, or
reference case) was then compared to alternative scenarios of higher radiative forc-
ing due to higher emissions from human activities, which were produced by the IA
modelers in WG III. The WG III or IA view of reference cases (akin to independently
existing things) versus experimental scenarios (akin to real things) is made clear by a
recent discussion of new socioeconomic scenarios for climate change research. Brian
O’Neill and colleagues explain,
… [B]ecause the SSPs [Shared Socioeconomic Reference Pathways] are one
part of a larger framework for scenario development, they represent reference
cases that do not include elements that will be objects of study of the overall
framework, namely climate change, its impacts, and climate policy responses.
As a consequence, the SSPs should be seen as hypothetical (counter-factual)
development pathways that serve as a starting point for developing integrated
scenarios of the future, rather than as plausible scenarios themselves (2013 ms.,
p. 13).
Thus it can be seen that, in climate change research, distinctions are made between two
views of the future: a future condition that acts as a ‘control’ for analytical and infer-
ential purposes (i.e., some counterfactual) and corresponds to objectivity meaning (4),
independently existing; and alternative futures that are not considered independently
existing from our decisions and are real objects of study, corresponding to objectivity
meaning (5). This careful construction for how the future is conceptualized in scien-
tific assessments of climate change has much larger implications for the burdens of
scenarios in the scientific context. The existence of the construct for an ‘independently
existing’ counterfactual of the future (a reference case) forces the relevance of the three
methodological meanings of objective [(1) public, (2) detached, (3) unbiased], as well
as the two social meanings [(6) procedurally objective and (7) structurally objective].
This is because, in order for a reference case to be a meaningful projection of our
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presently experienced reality, it must meet these methodological and social meanings
of objective. This requirement for the reference case imposes similar methodological
demands on alternative ‘real’ futures if they are to be meaningful comparisons for
making inferences about policy decisions. For these reasons, dismissing objectivity
meaning (4), independently existing, for the shape of the ‘future’ in the context of
climate change research is a mistake.
Since the IPCC context is strongly scientific, there is pressure on any methodology
adopted for its purposes to be highly objective: in our case, this includes achieving high
levels of peer accessibility [(1), public, and (7) structurally objective]. Socioeconomic
scenarios should thus also aim to represent accurate and fair (that is, (2) detached and
(3) unbiased) reflections of our knowledge at this time, which can only be ensured
with (6) procedural objectivity. In contrast, as we noted in Sect. 6, scenarios generated
using Intuitive Logics methods focus only on developing (5) real scenarios, and do
not distinguish scenarios that would be more likely from those that would be highly
unlikely, an undesirable feature for IPCC uses. That is, there are strong elements of
bias and possibly also wishful thinking at work in the Intuitive Logics methodologies.
In fact, that wishful thinking may have been operant in socioeconomic scenarios
featured by the IPCC (discussed in Sect. 3.1) was forcefully argued by Bastien Girod
and Thomas Flueeler, who have at times been critical of Intuitive Logics scenarios as
used by the IPCC. They noted,
The challenges will be that the participants of the governmental review [of IPCC
reports] have different worldviews and each would like to see the storyline
describing his or her worldview supposedly leading to low GHG [greenhouse
gas] emissions. …The pressure will certainly remain that storylines describe
wishful thinking—where climate problems are almost automatically solved—
instead of consistent future development paths (2009, p. 9).
In their assessment using CIB analysis of the very same scenarios discussed by Girod
and Flueeler, Schweizer and Kriegler (2012) found that had the CIB method been avail-
able in the 1990s to those who developed the scenarios used by the IPCC, they had
enough unbiased information to ‘know’ that high greenhouse gas emissions futures
were ‘more likely’ in the absence of global climate policy than low-emissions futures.
Although this might seem obvious, as discussed in Sect. 3.1, Intuitive Logics eschews
providing information on the likelihood of any scenario or elevating any particular sce-
nario as more plausible than another. In addition, Intuitive Logics demand that scenario
authors identify plausible alternative futures that are very different from each other.
These conventions motivated the decision to describe alternative futures that focused
on conventional socioeconomic development powered by fossil fuels (in Fig. 1, A1
and A2 futures) versus sustainable futures where fossil fuels were no longer dominant
(in Fig. 1, B1 and B2). From a much larger sampling of the space of possible futures
(1,728 scenarios), Schweizer and Kriegler (2012) found many more examples of high-
emissions futures with perfect or nearly perfect internal consistency in comparison to
low emissions futures. Moreover, they repeatedly modified judgments in their CIB
analysis to investigate the effects of alternative socioeconomic assumptions on this
result (i.e., a sensitivity analysis). They found that high-emissions futures remained
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dominant in the set of internally consistent futures. They also pinpointed particular
changes in assumptions that could significantly enhance the internal consistency of
sustainable futures: the strength of global environmental policy to decrease reliance
on fossil fuels and to increase the efficient use of energy. Only when the influences of
global environmental policy were strong would sustainable futures improve from low
or marginal internal consistency to nearly perfect or perfect internal consistency. In
effect, this finding represents that environmental policies would require strong incen-
tive or enforcement mechanisms to achieve the twin goals necessary for diminishing
climate change: accelerated phase-outs of fossil fuel use and of older, less-efficient
energy-related technologies. Commenting on the significance of their findings overall,
Schweizer and Kriegler said,
… [T]he global mitigation challenge should not be understated, yet the presen-
tation of [IPCC] storylines with very low carbon intensity [i.e. low emissions]
as ‘equally plausible’ to those with high carbon intensity [high emissions] may
do just that (2012, p. 11).
The study by Schweizer and Kriegler is actually a very successful example of the merits
of CIB. As previously mentioned, scenario builders for the IPCC had enough unbiased
information in the 1990s to ‘know’ that high greenhouse emissions futures were ‘more
likely’ in the absence of global climate policy. Aside from the fact that this view was
not anticipated (and instead, actively discouraged) by Intuitive Logics, evidence for
this international trend was not truly known until about 10 years later, when researchers
looked back and noted that they observed emissions rates that tracked or exceeded the
highest emissions profiles developed with Intuitive Logics (see Raupach et al. 2007
and Pielke et al. 2008). Thus the CIB method is more objective in one of the most
desirable ways, through enhancing the ability of scenario analyses to be closer to the
eventually observed reality. This is because by providing the procedural objectivity
(6) to neutralize usually dominant cognitive and social biases (achieving ‘objective’
meanings (2) detached and (3) unbiased) and generating a publicly available record
of judgments (‘objective’ meaning (1) public), CIB fulfills the promised linkage in
scientific investigation between objective methods (meanings 1, 2, 3, and 6), and
knowledge of independently existing reality (meanings 4 and 5).
In our analysis, the CIB methodology tempers and eliminates aspects of wishful
thinking, or conscious attachment, and the unconscious cognitive biases previously
discussed in Sect. 3.3 quite successfully. It does so by eliminating holistic judgments,
which result in tendencies to spuriously connect some elements of socioeconomic sys-
tems with other elements without publicly inspectable reasons. Thus the CIB method-
ology is especially suitable for the purposes of producing scenarios for climate change
assessments like those undertaken by the IPCC. By breaking up the judgments of corre-
lations between scenario elements into pairwise judgments, and prohibiting the expert
from making gross judgments about the plausibility of the final, gross scenarios, CIB
does not invite biases to appear by its methods alone.
Finally, the CIB methods actively elicit odd and elusive bits of information and
judgments about correlations between variables from experts, which are then fed into
the aggregate models, and are not, as in the Intuitive Logics context, later made invis-
123
2084 Synthese (2014) 191:2049–2088
ible and ineffective through the group processing methodology itself, but rather kept
as live ideas that can influence the end product of a CIB analysis. Such ‘marginalized
information’ has already been shown to produce significant results using CIB meth-
ods, as reviewed above and in Sect. 5.2 (Schweizer and Kriegler 2012; Schweizer and
O’Neill 2013). The ability of a method to elicit, retain, and effectively access such hid-
den or obscure knowledge and judgments provides a significant information process-
ing advantage to CIB methods that is unavailable to Intuitive Logics, which simply
cannot match it. Hence, because the IPCC needs socioeconomic scenario develop-
ment methods appropriate for scientific assessments of climate change that effectively
and efficiently explore, and evaluate, surprising, unexpected, high-impact, or possible
futures, the CIB methods are superior to Intuitive Logics methods for the IPCC’s tasks,
due partly to its greater objectivity, under several meanings of the term.
8 Conclusion
Socioeconomic scenarios play a special role in environmental change assessments,
including the climate change assessments of the IPCC. Such scenarios specify alter-
native assumptions for potential futures involving human choices around economic
development and technology choices, which are needed to understand potential envi-
ronmental impacts of human activity. Over the past decade, the development of these
scenarios has rested upon Intuitive Logics methodology. Intuitive Logics have been
very useful, both in business and in civic applications. The methods, however, have
grave weaknesses for scientific work, involving the limitations of the human mind as
a calculator and integrator of multifaceted and multidisciplinary information, as well
as the unconscious psychological biases or subjective prejudices of given experts in
consensus opinions developed by interdisciplinary groups involving the plausibility
of scenarios under study. We have discussed the importation of an alternative method
that also utilizes expert opinion, the CIB, which we have argued is far more suitable
for producing socioeconomic scenarios needed for scientific assessments, particu-
larly for climate change. The approach elicits expert opinion regarding a variety of
possible socioeconomic influences—some of which might not be obvious or even
contested (so-called ‘marginalized information’). The CIB method then explores a
full array of possible socioeconomic variable combinations and their internal con-
sistencies. Because of its systematic, disaggregated, and public procedure, the CIB
method has the advantages of making storyline scenarios replicable as well as limit-
ing the known cognitive and social biases, especially groupthink, involved in making
the interdisciplinary judgments involved in scenario building. Additionally, it tests
very large numbers of variable combinations for consistency. This not only produces
the desired information concerning relative consistency but uncovers unusual and sur-
prising scenario combinations regardless of their perceived likelihood. This means
that CIB can highlight internally consistent scenarios that, for whatever reason, are
perceived as unlikely but have high impact. We would like to clarify here that such
scenarios could be perceived as unlikely for a variety of reasons—for instance, they
might be unpleasant to entertain—but such scenarios that are internally consistent
nevertheless are very important and should not be confused with scenarios that are
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unlikely because they are internally inconsistent. Such internally consistent, high-
impact, yet perceived as ‘low-likelihood’ scenarios are contingencies that should be
planned for or guarded against, and are highly significant for planning in the face
of a changing climate. In this regard, we also discussed the one study that has sys-
tematically assessed socioeconomic scenarios for climate change research that were
developed with Intuitive Logics (Schweizer and Kriegler 2012). In that study, it was
found that had the CIB method been available at the time the scenarios were devel-
oped in the 1990s, the scenario author team would have had sufficient information to
anticipate the very high carbon dioxide emissions rates that occurred through 2005 as
‘most likely’ in the absence of climate policy. The significance of such information
at the turn of the twenty-first century, when the Kyoto Protocol was being negotiated
and the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations in the US were considering whether
to urge Congress toward ratification, can only be speculated. What in fact did happen
is that the IPCC presented low-emissions ‘sustainable’ futures in the absence of cli-
mate policy as ‘equally plausible’ to high-emissions futures, in line with the Intuitive
Logics method. Thus there remained plenty of room for high-emitting countries like
the US to interpret small changes in climate (a global average temperature change of
approximately 2 ◦C by the year 2100) as equally plausible to dangerous climate change
(approximately 5 ◦C by the year 2100; see IPCC 2001). Such deep uncertainty hardly
motivates serious climate policy, and the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. To this
day, many perceive the lack of US climate policy as a major setback to addressing
climate change, as the US is the second-largest emitter in the world.
From a purely philosophical perspective, the CIB method clearly promotes an
increase of objectivity—under several definitions, (1) public, (2) detached, (3) unbi-
ased, and (6) procedurally objective—when contrasted with the Intuitive Logics
approaches. Additionally, by its procedures, the CIB method invites the incorporation
of obscure interdisciplinary information and retains this information in the scenario
building process, while Intuitive Logics is prone to losing it through unconscious
cognitive biases as well as groupthink. Moreover, through its public display of dis-
aggregated judgments, CIB is more responsive to improvements in data or theory. In
our view, these qualities of CIB also enhance (7) structural objectivity over Intuitive
Logics. Previous problems with restrictions on imagination or possibilities using more
technical approaches to developing scenarios have been addressed, and the analyses
now available allow consideration of an even wider space of potential scenarios. In
the IPCC context, authors are required to produce scientific reports, and our analysis
shows that there are new options available offering more objective and—by fulfilling
the unspoken link between methodological objectivity (‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’
meanings 1, 2, 3, and 6) and objectivity about the real, (meanings (4) independently
existing and (5) real)—more scientific methods for developing and assessing socioe-
conomic scenario studies.
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